 <u> </u>	30 September 1953
	Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGE	NCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 6 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 12 EJ DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: 197	C 2009
AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: /9//2/79 REVIEWER	:
	•
Office of Current I	ntelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGE	NCE AGENCY

25X1A

SUMMARY

SOVIET UNION

- 1. New Georgian leader appears to be Khrushchev appointment (page 3).
- 2. Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural machinery (page 3).

FAR EAST

3. Rhee insists on permanent exchange rate (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

- 4. Burma's need for arms indicated (page 4).
- 5. Indonesian army fears Darul Islam attempt to seize capital (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- British may change views on compensation agreement on Iranian oil (page 6).
- 8. Moroccan tribesmen reportedly still loyal to deposed sultan (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

10. Comment on the death of West Berlin mayor Reuter (page 7).

* * * * * 25X1A

25X1A

30 Sept 53

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001300160001-9

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001300160001-9

1. New Georgian leader appears to be Khrushchev appointment: The choice of V. P. Mzhavanadze as first secretary of the Georgian republic's party organization is apparently another move by Moscow to terminate the conflicts in that republic's leadership. During the past two years Georgian politics have been characterized by purges and counterpurges of seemingly pro- and anti-Beria elements. Mzhavanadze, though of Georgian extraction, is an outsider to the Georgian political scene. He gained his political experience in the Ukraine when Khrushchev was that republic's party leader. He attained the rank of lieutenant general in 1944 and was the top political officer for the Kiev Military District from 1946 until at least 1950. In April 1950 he was elected to the Ukrainian party's Organizational Buro. Party leaders in Georgia are now probably controlled directly by Khrushchev, the first party secretary in Moscow, who has no native ties and is not likely to meddle in Georgian affairs for sentimental motives as did Stalin and Beria. 2. Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural machinery: The 26 and 29 September decrees of the Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors and other types of agricultural machinery underscore the priority now being given to the new Soviet agricultural mechanization program. The Ministry of Defense Industry has never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not produced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years. The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is still to be handled by the industrial ministries have been ordered to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and the production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production		SOVIET UNION	
first secretary of the Georgian republic's party organization is apparently another move by Moscow to terminate the conflicts in that republic's leadership. During the past two years Georgian politics have been characterized by purges and counterpurges of seemingly pro- and anti-Beria elements. Mzhavanadze, though of Georgian extraction, is an outsider to the Georgian political scene. He gained his political experience in the Ukraine when Khrushchev was that republic's party leader. He attained the rank of lieutenant general in 1944 and was the top political officer for the Kiev Military District from 1946 until at least 1950. In April 1950 he was elected to the Ukrainian party's Organizational Buro. Party leaders in Georgia are now probably controlled directly by Khrushchev, the first party secretary in Moscow, who has no native ties and is not likely to meddle in Georgian affairs for sentimental motives as did Stalin and Beria. 2. Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural machinery: 25X1A The 26 and 29 September decrees of the Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors and other types of agricultural machinery underscore the priority now being given to the new Soviet agricultural mechanization program. The Ministry of Defense Industry has never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not produced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years. The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is still to be handled by the industrial ministries have been ordered to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and the production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production	1.	New Georgian leader appears to be Khrushchev ap	ppointment:
traction, is an outsider to the Georgian political scene. He gained his political experience in the Ukraine when Khrushchev was that republic's party leader. He attained the rank of lieutenant general in 1944 and was the top political officer for the Kiev Military District from 1946 until at least 1950. In April 1950 he was elected to the Ukrainian party's Organizational Buro. Party leaders in Georgia are now probably controlled directly by Khrushchev, the first party secretary in Moscow, who has no native ties and is not likely to meddle in Georgian affairs for sentimental motives as did Stalin and Beria. 2. Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural machinery: The 26 and 29 September decrees of the Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors and other types of agricultural machinery underscore the priority now being given to the new Soviet agricultural mechanization program. The Ministry of Defense Industry has never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not produced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years. The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is still to be handled by the industrial ministries. The defense ministries have been ordered to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and this production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production	25X1A [first secretary of the Georgian republic's party of apparently another move by Moscow to terminate in that republic's leadership. During the past two politics have been characterized by purges and contact the secretary of the Georgian republic's party of apparently another move by Moscow to terminate in that republic's party of apparently another move by Moscow to terminate in that republic's leadership.	rganization is the conflicts years Georgian
ably controlled directly by Khrushchev, the first party secretary in Moscow, who has no native ties and is not likely to meddle in Georgian affairs for sentimental motives as did Stalin and Beria. 2. Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural machinery: The 26 and 29 September decrees of the Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors and other types of agricultural machinery underscore the priority now being given to the new Soviet agricultural mechanization program. The Ministry of Defense Industry has never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not produced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years. The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is still to be handled by the industrial ministries. The defense ministries have been ordered to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and the production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production.		traction, is an outsider to the Georgian political s gained his political experience in the Ukraine whe was that republic's party leader. He attained the tenant general in 1944 and was the top political of Kiev Military District from 1946 until at least 195	scene. He on Khrushchev rank of lieu- ficer for the 50. In April
The 26 and 29 September decrees of the Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors and other types of agricultural machinery underscore the priority now being given to the new Soviet agricultural mechanization program. The Ministry of Defense Industry has never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not produced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years. The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is still to be handled by the industrial ministries. The defense ministries have been ordered to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and the production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production.		ably controlled directly by Khrushchev, the first in Moscow, who has no native ties and is not likel	party secretary ly to meddle in
The 26 and 29 September decrees of the Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Defense Industry and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors and other types of agricultural machinery underscore the priority now being given to the new Soviet agricultural mechanization program. The Ministry of Defense Industry has never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not produced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years. The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is still to be handled by the industrial ministries. The defense ministries have been ordered to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and the production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production.	2.	Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural m	achinery:
never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not produced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years. The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is still to be handled by the industrial ministries. The defense ministries have been ordered to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and this production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production. - 3 -	. [The 26 and 29 September Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Def and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors a of agricultural machinery underscore the priority	decrees of the fense Industry and other types now being given
to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and this production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production - 3 -		never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviat duced agricultural machinery since the immediate The bulk of new agricultural machinery production	tion has not pro- e postwar years.
05)/44		to produce only small quantities of agricultural magnetic production could be offset by increases in product	achinery, and this tivity or capacity
30 Sept 3		- 3 - 25X1A	30 Sept 53

25X1A	<u>. </u>
Approved For Release 2004	/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A091300160001-9
	FAR EAST
Rhee insists on permane	nt exchange rate:
program to Korea will b	President Rhee has stubbornly rejected American proposals for establishing a realistic and flexible exchange rate, according to American economic adviser nent rate, Rhee insists, the American aid e valueless and Korean recovery impossible. resident Eisenhower requesting United States e of exchange.
not from a desire to dri from a "deeply felt erro in the past caused inflat	Wood believes that Rhee's attitude stems we a bargain with the United States, but neous conception" that repeated rate changes ion.
S	SOUTHEAST ASIA
Burma's need for arms	indicated:
	American service attaches in Rangoon are convinced that the Burmese armed forces could effectively use much more military equipment than is being supplied to them by the British Service Mission.
practice of controlling I the government. He be	Ambassador Sebald comments that the inaware of the resentment caused by their Burma's arms supply as a lever to influence lieves that this British policy is the chief eat to terminate the mission.
resentment is now directis closely associated wi	The ambassador states that Burmese cted also against the United States, which ith Britain in Burmese eyes.
	- 4 -

3.

25X1A

25X1A

30 Sept 53

25X1A

25X1A Approved For Re	ease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 ⁻	 300160001-9
	•	•

attempted to procure arms from the United States and elsewhere all over the world, including areas behind the iron curtain. Their requirements will become increasingly acute as their campaign against the Chinese Nationalists gains momentum.

25X1

	5.	Indonesian army fears Darul Islam attempt to seize capital:
25X1A		Indonesian army troops in Djakarta have been ordered to carry arms at all times because of the fear that the Darul Islam, an insurgent Moslem organization, will
25X1		try to seize the city from within,
		Comment: The government may fear Darul Islam disturbances as a gesture of support to the Moslem dissidents in North Sumatra. The American air attache in Djakarta reported on 29 September that virtually all of the extreme northern end of Sumatra was held by rebel forces. Some units from Djakarta have been included among the reinforcements dispatched to Sumatra.
		NEAR EAST - AFRICA
	6.	Iranian premier apparently preparing for oil settlement talks:
25X1A		Prime Minister Zahedi's blunt public announcement on 29 September that Iran cannot embark on its much-needed economic development program without an oil settlement is his first step toward opening discussions with Britain. By exaggerating the deteriorated condition of the oil installations, the prime minister may have been attempting to prepare the Iranian public for possible compromises.
		prepare the transaction position position
		- 5 -
		25X1A 30 Sept 53

	<u>25X1A </u>			_
Approved For	· Release	2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP7	9T00975A00	1300160001-9

The prime minister has given no hint, however, as to how he intends to approach the oil problem. Strong public sentiment gives him only limited opportunity for compromises within the framework of Mossadeq's oil nationalization law.

25X1

•		
	7.	British may change views on compensation agreement on Iranian oil:
25X1A		The American embassy in London has learned that with the departure from the cabinet of Lord Leathers, said to be the foremost proponent of settling compensa-
		tion for the loss of Iranian oil through international arbitration, a change may occur in British views on this problem. London may now seek an interim marketing agreement which would put the compensation issue at least temporarily into the background.
- -		Comment: For almost a year Britain has insisted that any agreement with Iran provide for settlement of the compensation question through international arbitration.
	8.	Moroccan tribesmen reportedly still loyal to deposed sultan:
25X1		
		the vast majority of tribesmen are now completely disillusioned with France and are steadfastly loyal to the deposed sultan.
		2
		- 0 -
		25X1A 30 Sept 53

	سين	v ⊊ı	Approved For Releas	se 2004/01/16 :	CIA-RDP79T0097	75A001\$001600	o1-9	
							,	25X1
								20/(1
	w.c.							
25X1		L	continue to claim to popularity among two months.	that the tribe	smen are loya	ren	ch un-	25X1
	. [-				· ·	
								25X1
	· .							
	.·							•
	•	10.	Comment on the	death of West	Berlin mayo	r Reuter:		
25X1			a serious probler since there is no	n for the stal	death of Mayo bility of the W ature to repla	'est Berlin go	er poses overnment	
	<i>t</i> ,				- 7 -			
				25X1A			30 Sept 53	

Prior to Reuter's death there had been considerable opposition to the existing coalition of Socialists and Free Democrats which he headed, and growing agitation from Christian Democratic and Free Democratic leaders for a West Berlin government reflecting Chancellor Adenauer's election triumph.

The Christian Democrats are believed to be in a position to dominate the next West Berlin government. Although Berlin Christian Democratic chairman Robert Tillmanns has been prominently mentioned as a successor to Reuter, the final choice will probably be left up to Adenauer.

Reuter's death also removes potentially powerful opposition within the Social Democratic Party to its present anti-Western integration foreign policy. Reuter reportedly never fully agreed with Socialist foreign policy and immediately after the 6 September elections pushed for changes in the party's policy.